By Ralph Ellis (auth.)
The item of this research is to discover a coherent theoretical method of 3 difficulties which seem to interrelate in complicated methods: (1) what's the ontological prestige of attention? (2) How can there be 'un conscious,' 'prereflective' or 'self-alienated' awareness? And (3) Is there a 'self' or 'ego' shaped through the interrelation of extra straight forward states of cognizance? the incentive for combining any such variety of adverse questions is that we frequently examine extra by means of taking a look at interrelations of difficulties than lets by means of viewing them purely in isola tion. the 3 questions posed the following have emerged as particularly prob lematic within the context of 20th century philosophy. 1. The query of the ontological prestige of awareness The query 'What is consciousness?' is among the such a lot difficult in philosophy-so difficult that many were stimulated to continue as if attention didn't exist. If William James was once talking rhetorically whilst he stated "Consciousness doesn't exist," 1 many behaviorists of the hot earlier weren't. 2 James intended purely to suggest that realization isn't really an independently latest soul-substance, alongside aspect actual elements. He didn't suggest that we don't rather 'have' recognition, and he didn't supply ultimate answer for the matter of the causal interrelations among cognizance and the actual realm (e. g. , our bodies). Many fresh philosophers and psychologists, even though, attempt to continue as if those difficulties didn't exist.
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Extra info for An Ontology of Consciousness
The psychologist may choose first to do phenomenology in its purely philosophical sense in order to investigate essential and necessary aspects of the phenomenon of consciousness per se; he may ask, "What does it mean to be a conscious being in general? D. Laing relies heavily on this method, first exploring the meaning of pure possibilities for consciousness and then attempting to apply what he has learned through such analysis to his particular cases. 30 And Needleman and Binswanger use it in the work by those authors previously cited.
How is she to know 40 AN ONTOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS whether Laing's account applies to her particular case? There are many other eidetic descriptions that might apply to the same factual situation, as far as the facts are known. For example, she may indeed want to be married to Jack although communication problems have led to the present state of affairs. The same problem applies in Berne's 'transactional analysis,' for no way is given to determine in any given case which of the 'games' Berne describes is the one in fact being played.
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